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Abstract
We present some equivalences between some symmetric dualities in nonlinear programming and
some matrix games. We study three pairs of dual problems: Wolfe, Mond–Weir and fractional types.
For each pair, the paper presents two different zero-sum games whose Nash equilibria correspond
to the solutions of the pair of nonlinear symmetric dual problems. And certain conclusions about
symmetric dual fractional programming and its special cases are also treated.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Symmetric duality in nonlinear programming was introduced by Dorn [7] and Dorn [7]
gave a symmetric dual theorem for quadratic programs while Dantzig et al. [6] and Mond
[13] formulated a pair of symmetric dual programs involving a scalar function f (x, y),
x ∈Rn, y ∈Rm under the condition that f (·, y) is convex and f (x, ·) is concave. Cottle [4]
presented a slightly different pair of symmetric dual quadratic programs. A different pair
of symmetric dual nonlinear programs was given by Mond and Weir [14], which allows
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of symmetric dual fractional programming problems under suitable convexity hypothesis.
Recently, Kim et al. [10] presented a pair of symmetric variational problems and very
recently Kim and Lee [11,12] extended symmetric duality theorems for multiobjective
variational problems.
In [5], some equivalence between linear programming duality and a symmetric matrix
is given. In the finite dimensional setting, Chandra et al. [1] presented analogues of results
from [5] for a certain class of nonlinear programming problems. For the infinite dimen-
sional case, similar results have been obtained by Tijs [16] for semi-infinite programming,
and Forgo [8] and Underwood [17] for continuous linear programming. And also Chandra
et al. [3] studied continuous linear programs which has been introduced by Bellman and
studied by Levinson and Tyndall and continuous matrix game equivalence.
Kemp and Kimura [9] gave an equivalence theorem where the matrix game is not nec-
essarily a symmetric game. In this case the matrix game depends on primal and dual
variables. Recently Preda [15] gave analogues of Theorem 17 due to [9] for a certain
class of nonlinear programming problems, where matrix games depend only on primal
variables. These problems are finite dimensional and satisfy certain generalized convexity
requirements.
The main purpose of this paper is to present some equivalences between some sym-
metric dualities in nonlinear programming and some matrix games. For this intention, the
content has been divided into 4 sections. In Section 2 we give some equivalences between
the Wolfe type symmetric duality [13] of a nonlinear programming problem and some ma-
trix games and its example. Mond–Weir type symmetric duality [14] is treated in Section 3.
In Section 4 we obtain some equivalences between symmetric dual fractional programming
[5] and some matrix games. Also we consider a special case of symmetric dual fractional
programming [2].
2. Wolfe symmetric duality and matrix game
Let us consider the nonlinear symmetric programming problem (WP) together with its
Wolfe dual (WD) [13] as follows:
(WP) Minimize f (x, y)− yT ∇yf (x, y)
subject to − ∇yf (x, y) 0,
x  0,
(WD) Maximize f (u, v) − uT ∇uf (u, v)
subject to − ∇uf (u, v) 0,
v  0.
Small letters will denote vectors and capital letters matrices. AT will denote transpose
of A. LetRk be a k-dimensional Euclidean space and f (x, y) be a real-valued differentiate
function of x and y , where x and y have dimensions n and m, respectively. For each fixed y ,
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by the above conditions. And x ∈Rn, y ∈Rm, u ∈Rn, v ∈Rm.
The following lemma is due to [1].
Lemma 2.1. For a matrix game described by a skew symmetric matrix B , the value of the
game is zero, and y¯ is an optimal strategy for player 2 (or 1) if and only if By¯  0.
Now define the following (n + m + 1) × (n + m + 1) skew symmetric matrix:
B1(x, y) =

 0 −x∇yf (x, y)
T − xyT −∇xf (x, y) + xyT y
∇yf (x, y)xT + yxT 0 ∇yf (x, y) − yxT x
∇xf (x, y)T − yT yxT −∇yf (x, y)T + xT xyT 0

 .
Note that we can propose a number of different matrices.
Theorem 2.1. Let (x¯, y¯) be a feasible solution to both (WP) and (WD), with y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯)
= x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) = 0. Let z∗ = 1/(1 +∑j x¯j + ∑i y¯i), x∗ = z∗x¯ , and y∗ = z∗y¯ . Then
(x∗, y∗, z∗) solves the matrix game B1(x¯, y¯).
Proof. From the hypotheses of the theorem, we have the following:
−∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0, (1)
−∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0, (2)
y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) = x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) = 0, (3)
x¯  0, y¯  0. (4)
Multiplying (3) by x¯  0 gives −x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ = 0 and from (2) we obtain
−x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ − ∇yf (x¯, y¯) − x¯y¯T y¯ + x¯y¯T y¯  0. (5)
Multiplying (1) by x¯T x¯  0, we have ∇yf (x¯, y¯)x¯T x¯  0. It implies that since ∇yf (x¯, y¯)
 0,
∇yf (x¯, y¯)x¯T x¯ + ∇yf (x¯, y¯) − y¯x¯T x¯ + y¯x¯T x¯  0. (6)
From (3) we have
∇xf (x¯, y¯)T x¯ − ∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ − y¯T y¯x¯T x¯ + y¯T y¯x¯T x¯ = 0. (7)
But z∗ > 0 by (4), and hence, expressing relations (5)–(7) and (4) in terms of x∗, y∗, we
get
−[x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯y¯T ]y∗ − [∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯y¯T y¯]z∗  0, (8)[∇yf (x¯, y¯)x¯T + y¯x¯T ]x∗ + [∇yf (x¯, y¯) − y¯x¯T x¯]z∗  0, (9)[∇xf (x¯, y¯)T − y¯T y¯x¯T ]x∗ − [∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯T x¯y¯T ]y∗ = 0, (10)
x∗  0, y∗  0, (11)
x∗ + y∗ + z∗ = 1. (12)
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B1(x¯, y¯)ξ
∗  0, (13)
with ξ∗ = col(x∗, y∗, z∗), where col denotes column vector. Now (13) together with (11)
and (12), is implied by Lemma 2.1 that ξ∗ is an optimal strategy for player 2 in the matrix
game B1(x¯, y¯). Since B1(x¯, y¯) is skew symmetric, the value of the matrix game B1(x¯, y¯)
is zero and ξ∗ is an optimal strategy to player 1 as well. Thus (x∗, y∗, z∗) solves the matrix
game B1(x¯, y¯). 
Theorem 2.2. Let (x∗, y∗, z∗) with z∗ > 0, solves the matrix game B1(x¯, y¯), where x¯ =
x∗/z∗ and y¯ = y∗/z∗. Then (x¯, y¯) is a feasible solution to both (WP) and (WD), with the
two objective functions having equal values. In addition, if there is weak duality between
(WP) and (WD) then (x¯, y¯) is optimal to both problems.
Proof. Let ξ∗ = col(x∗, y∗, z∗). Then, by Lemma 2.1, B1(x¯, y¯)ξ∗  0. Thus
−[x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯y¯T ]y∗ − [∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯y¯T y¯]z∗  0, (14)[∇yf (x¯, y¯)x¯T + y¯x¯T ]x∗ + [∇yf (x¯, y¯) − y¯x¯T x¯]z∗  0, (15)[∇xf (x¯, y¯)T − y¯T y¯x¯T ]x∗ − [∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯T x¯y¯T ]y∗  0, (16)
x∗  0, y∗  0, (17)
x∗ + y∗ + z∗ = 1. (18)
Dividing (14)–(16) by z∗ > 0, we have
−[x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯y¯T ]y¯ − ∇xf (x¯, y¯) + x¯y¯T y¯  0, (19)[∇yf (x¯, y¯)x¯T + y¯x¯T ]x¯ + ∇yf (x¯, y¯) − y¯x¯T x¯  0, (20)[∇xf (x¯, y¯)T − y¯T y¯x¯T ]x¯ − [∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯T x¯y¯T ]y¯T  0. (21)
From (17) and (18),
x¯  0, y¯  0. (22)
By (20), ∇yf (x¯, y¯)[x¯T x¯ + 1] 0. It implies that since x¯T x¯ + 1 > 0,
−∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0. (23)
From (19), −x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ ∇xf (x¯, y¯). Using (22) and (23), we obtain
0−x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ ∇xf (x¯, y¯).
It implies that
−∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0. (24)
From (21), x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯)  y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯). But since x¯  0 and ∇xf (x¯, y¯)  0,
x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0 and since y¯  0 and ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0, y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0. Then we have
0 x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0.
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and the objective function of (WP) equals the objective function of (WD) at (x¯, y¯). This,
with weak duality, proves that (x¯, y¯) is optimal for both (WP) and (WD). 
Now we consider the matrix game associated with the following (n + 1) × (m + 1)
matrix:
M1(x, y) =
[ −x∇yf (x, y)T − xyT −∇xf (x, y)+ xyT y
−∇yf (x, y)T + xT xyT xT ∇xf (x, y)− xT xyT y
]
.
Theorem 2.3. Let
P 0 =
[
x0
z01
]
, Q0 =
[
y0
z02
]
,
x¯ = x0/z01, y¯ = y0/z02
with z01 > 0, z
0
2 > 0. Let (P 0,Q0) be an equilibrium point for the matrix game M1(x¯, y¯)
and P 0T M1(x¯, y¯)Q0 = 0. Then (x¯, y¯) is a feasible solution to both (WP) and (WD) with
the two objective functions having equal values. If also weak duality holds between (WP)
and (WD), then (x¯, y¯) is optimal for both problems.
Proof. Because the value of the game (in random extension) is zero and (P 0,Q0) is an
equilibrium point hence we obtain
M1(x¯, y¯)Q
0  0 and P 0T M1(x¯, y¯) 0.
Hence[−x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯y¯T ]y0 + [−∇xf (x¯, y¯) + x¯y¯T y¯]z02  0,[−∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯T x¯y¯T ]y0 + [x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯T x¯y¯T y¯]z02  0,
x0T
[−x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯y¯T ]+ [−∇yf (x¯, y¯) + x¯T x¯y¯T ]z01  0,
x0T
[−∇xf (x¯, y¯) + x¯y¯T y¯]+ [−x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯T x¯y¯T y¯]z01  0.
But x0  0, y0  0, z01 > 0, z02 > 0 and therefore from above we obtain[−x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯y¯T ]y¯ − ∇xf (x¯, y¯) + x¯y¯T y¯  0, (25)[−∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯T x¯y¯T ]y¯ + x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯T x¯y¯T y¯  0, (26)
x¯T
[−x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯y¯T ]− ∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯T x¯y¯T  0, (27)
x¯T
[−∇xf (x¯, y¯) + x¯y¯T y¯]+ x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯T x¯y¯T y¯  0. (28)
From (27), we get −[x¯T x¯ + 1]∇yf (x¯, y¯)T  0. But since x¯T x¯ + 1 > 0, −∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0.
The above inequalities and x¯  0, y¯  0 gives −∇xf (x¯, y¯)  0 by (25). And (26) gives
x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯)  ∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯. But since x¯  0 and ∇xf (x¯, y¯)  0, x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯)  0,
and since y¯  0 and ∇yf (x¯, y¯)  0, y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯)  0. Then 0  x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) 
y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0. Hence we have x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) = y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) = 0. Thus (x¯, y¯) is feasi-
ble for both (WP) and (WD). If a weak duality exists between (WP) and (WD) then (x¯, y¯)
is optimal for both (WP) and (WD). 
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x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) = 0. Let
z01 = 1
/(
1 +
n∑
i=1
x¯i
)
, z02 = 1
/(
1 +
m∑
j=1
y¯i
)
,
P 0 =
[
z01x¯
z01
]
, Q0 =
[
z02y¯
z02
]
.
Then (P 0,Q0) solves the matrix game M1(x¯, y¯) and the value of this game is zero.
Proof. By the hypothesis y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) = 0, we have
P 0T M1(x¯, y¯)Q
0
=
[
z01x¯
z01
]T [ −x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯y¯T −∇xf (x¯, y¯) + x¯y¯T y¯
−∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯T x¯y¯T x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯T x¯y¯T y¯
][
z02y¯
z02
]
= z01z02
[−x¯T x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ − ∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯]
= z01z02
[−(x¯T x¯ + 1)∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯]= 0,
M1(x¯, y¯)Q
0
=
[ −x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯y¯T −∇xf (x¯, y¯) + x¯y¯T y¯
−∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯T x¯y¯T x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯T x¯y¯T y¯
][
z02y¯
z02
]
= z02
[ −x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ − ∇xf (x¯, y¯)
−∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ + x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯)
]
 0.
By the hypotheses of the theorem, −∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0 and ∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ = x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) = 0.
Then we have −x¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ − ∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0. Hence we have the above inequality.
P 0T M1(x¯, y¯) =
[
z01x¯
z01
]T [ −x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯y¯T −∇xf (x¯, y¯) + x¯y¯T y¯
−∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯T x¯y¯T x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯T x¯y¯T y¯
]
= z01
[−x¯T x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − ∇yf (x¯, y¯)T ,0] 0.
Since x¯T x¯ + 1 > 0 and ∇yf (x¯, y¯)  0, the above inequality holds. Thus (P 0,Q0) is an
equilibrium point for the matrix game M1(x¯, y¯) and the value of this game is zero. 
Example. Let f : [0,1] × [0,1] →R defined by
f (x, y) = x2 − 2y2 + 3xy − 2x − y.
For each fixed y , f (x, y) is convex in x and for each fixed x , f (x, y) is concave in y .
(x¯, y¯) = (11/17,4/17) is a feasible solution to both (WP) and (WD) with f (x¯, y¯) −
y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) = f (x¯, y¯) − x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) = −13/17. Then
B1(x¯, y¯) =


0 − 44172 176173
44
172 0 − 484173
176 484

− 173 173 0
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M1(x¯, y¯) =
[− 44172 176173
484
173 − 176173
]
satisfies Theorems 2.3 and 2.4.
3. Mond–Weir symmetric duality and matrix game
Let us consider a different pair of symmetric dual nonlinear programming problems
(MWP) together with its Mond–Weir dual (MWD) [14] in which the convexity and concav-
ity assumptions have been reduced to pseudo-convexity and pseudo-concavity, as follows:
(MWP) Minimize f (x, y)
subject to ∇yf (x, y) 0,
yT ∇yf (x, y) 0,
x  0,
(MWD) Maximize f (u, v)
subject to ∇uf (u, v) 0,
uT ∇uf (u, v) 0,
v  0.
Here f is a twice differentiable real-valued function of x and y , where x ∈ Rn, y ∈ Rm,
u ∈Rn and v ∈Rm.
Now we can consider the same matrix B1(x, y) and M1(x, y) in Section 2.
Theorem 3.1. Let (x¯, y¯) be a feasible solution to both (MWP) and (MWD). Let z∗ =
1/(1 +∑j x¯j +∑i y¯i), x∗ = z∗x¯ and y∗ = z∗y¯ . Then (x∗, y∗, z∗) solves the matrix game
B1(x¯, y¯).
Proof. By the conditions of the theorem we have the following:
∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0, (29)
y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0, (30)
∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0, (31)
x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0, (32)
x¯  0, y¯  0. (33)
From the above conditions we get[∇xf (x¯, y¯)T − y¯T y¯x¯T ]x∗ − [∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯T x¯y¯T ]y∗  0, (34)
−[x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯y¯T ]y∗ − [∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯y¯T y¯]z∗  0, (35)
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x∗  0, y∗  0, z∗ > 0, (37)
x∗ + y∗ + z∗ = 1. (38)
The above inequalities imply B1(x¯, y¯)ξ∗  0, with ξ∗ = col(x∗, y∗, z∗). Hence by
Lemma 2.2, ξ∗ is an optimal strategy for player 2 in the matrix game B1(x¯, y¯). Thus
(x∗, y∗, z∗) solves the matrix game B1(x¯, y¯). 
Theorem 3.2. Let (x∗, y∗, z∗), with z∗ > 0, solves the matrix game B1(x¯, y¯), where
x¯ = x∗/z∗ and y¯ = y∗/z∗. Then (x¯, y¯) is a feasible solution to both (MWP) and (MWD)
with the two objective functions having equal values. In addition, if there is weak duality
between (MWP) and (MWD) then (x¯, y¯) is optimal to both (MWP) and (MWD).
Proof. Let ξ∗ = col(x∗, y∗, z∗). Since ξ∗ solves the game B1(x¯, y¯) and the matrix is skew
symmetric, B1(x¯, y¯)ξ∗  0 by Lemma 2.1. Thus (34)–(38) hold. From (37), (38) we have
x¯  0, y¯  0.
Dividing (36) by z∗, we have ∇yf (x¯, y¯)x¯T x¯ + ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0. Since x¯T x¯ + 1 > 0, we
obtain
∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0. (39)
Dividing (34) by z∗, we get
x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) − y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0. (40)
Hence, since ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0 and y¯  0,
x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0. (41)
Dividing (35) by z∗ gives −x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ − ∇xf (x¯, y¯)  0. But from x¯  0, y¯  0
and (39), we get
∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0. (42)
By (40), (42) and x¯  0, we obtain
y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0. (43)
(39), (43) and x¯  0 give the feasibility of (x¯, y¯) to (MWP). Similarly (41), (42) and
y¯  0 show that (x¯, y¯) is feasible to (MWD). Hence we obtain the theorem. 
Theorem 3.3. Let
P 0 =
[
x0
z01
]
, Q0 =
[
y0
z02
]
,
x¯ = x0/z01, y¯ = y0/z02
with z01 > 0, z
0
2 > 0. Let (P 0,Q0) be an equilibrium point for the matrix game M1(x¯, y¯)
and P 0T M1(x¯, y¯)Q0 = 0. Then (x¯, y¯) is a feasible solution to both (MWP) and (MWD)
with the two objective functions having equal values. If also weak duality holds between
(MWP) and (MWD), then (x¯, y¯) is optimal for both problems.
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we obtain M1(x¯, y¯)Q0  0 and P 0T M1(x¯, y¯) 0, i.e.,[−x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯y¯T ]y0 + [−∇xf (x¯, y¯) + x¯y¯T y¯]z02  0,[−∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯T x¯y¯T ]y0 + [x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯T x¯y¯T y¯]z02  0,
x0T
[−x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯y¯T ]+ [−∇yf (x¯, y¯) + x¯T x¯y¯T ]z01  0,
x0T
[−∇xf (x¯, y¯) + x¯y¯T y¯]+ [x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯T x¯y¯T y¯]z01  0.
Since x0  0, y0  0, z01 > 0, z02 > 0, we obtain[−x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯y¯T ]y¯ − ∇xf (x¯, y¯) + x¯y¯T y¯  0, (44)[−∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯T x¯y¯T ]y¯ + x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯T x¯y¯T y¯  0, (45)
x¯T
[−x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − x¯y¯T ]− ∇yf (x¯, y¯)T + x¯T x¯y¯T  0, (46)
x¯T
[−∇xf (x¯, y¯) + x¯y¯T y¯]+ x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) − x¯T x¯y¯T y¯  0. (47)
Since x¯T x¯+1 > 0, ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0 by (46). From (45) we get x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯)∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ .
But ∇yf (x¯, y¯)  0 and y¯  0 give x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0. Since x¯  0, y¯  0 and ∇yf (x¯, y¯)
 0, from (44), ∇xf (x¯, y¯)  0. By (45), x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯)  ∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯, then using the
relation together with ∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0 and x¯  0 we obtain ∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯  0. Thus (x¯, y¯)
is a feasible solution for both (MWP) and (MWD). This, with weak duality, proves that
(x¯, y¯) is optimal for both (MWP) and (MWD). 
Theorem 3.4. Let (x¯, y¯) be a feasible solution to both (MWP) and (MWD). Let
z01 = 1
/(
1 +
n∑
i=1
x¯i
)
, z02 = 1
/(
1 +
n∑
j=1
y¯j
)
,
P 0 =
[
z01x¯
z01
]
, Q0 =
[
z02y¯
z02
]
.
Then (P 0,Q0) solves the matrix game M1(x¯, y¯) and the value of this game is zero.
Proof. We have
P 0T M1(x¯, y¯)Q
0 = z01z02
[−x¯T x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ − ∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯]
= z01z02
[−(x¯T x¯ + 1)∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯]= 0.
It follows from the hypotheses y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0 and y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0 by ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0,
y¯  0, that
M1(x¯, y¯)Q
0 = z02
[ −x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ − ∇xf (x¯, y¯)
−∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ + x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯)
]
 0.
Using x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0 and y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0, we get −∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯+ x¯T ∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0.
Since y¯T ∇yf (x¯, y¯) 0, ∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0 and x¯  0, −x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T y¯ − ∇xf (x¯, y¯) 0,
P 0T M1(x¯, y¯) = z0
[−x¯T x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − ∇yf (x¯, y¯)T ,0] 0.1
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obtain −x¯T x¯∇yf (x¯, y¯)T − ∇yf (x¯, y¯)T  0. Thus (P 0,Q0) is an equilibrium point for
the matrix game M1(x¯, y¯) and the value of this game is zero. 
4. Symmetric fractional duality and matrix game
Consider the following pair of symmetric fractional programs [2]:
(FP) Minimize F(x, y)
G(x, y)
subject to G(x,y)∇yF (x, y)− F(x, y)∇yG(x, y) 0,
yT
{
G(x,y)∇yF (x, y)− F(x, y)∇yG(x, y)
}
 0,
x  0,
(FD) Maximize F(u, v)
G(u, v)
subject to G(u,v)∇uF (u, v) − F(u, v)∇uG(u, v) 0,
uT
{
G(u,v)∇uF (u, v) − F(u, v)∇uG(u, v)
}
 0,
v  0.
Here F and G are twice differentiate functions from Rn × Rm to R, F(·, y) and G(x, ·)
are convex, F(x, ·) and G(·, y) are concave. It is further assumed throughout that in the
feasible regions defined by the above inequalities, G > 0 and F  0.
Let us now define the (n + m + 1) × (n + m + 1) skew symmetric matrix B2(x, y) as
follows:
B2(x, y) =
[ 0 −xΓ (x, y)T −∆(x,y)
Γ (x, y)xT 0 Γ (x, y)
∆(x, y)T −Γ (x, y)T 0
]
.
Here Γ (x, y) = G(x,y)∇yF (x, y) − F(x, y)∇yG(x, y), ∆(x,y) = G(x,y)∇xF (x, y) −
F(x, y)∇xG(x, y).
Theorem 4.1. Let (x¯, y¯) be a feasible solution to both (FP) and (FD). Let z∗ = 1/(1 +∑
j x¯j +
∑
i y¯i), x
∗ = z∗x¯ , and y∗ = z∗y¯. Then (x∗, y∗, z∗) solves the matrix game
B2(x¯, y¯).
Theorem 4.2. Let (x∗, y∗, z∗), with z∗ > 0, solves the matrix game B2(x¯, y¯), where x¯ =
x∗/z∗ and y¯ = y∗/z∗. Then (x¯, y¯) is a feasible solution to both (FP) and (FD) with the two
objective functions having equal values. In addition, if there is weak duality between (FP)
and (FD) then (x¯, y¯) is optimal to both problems.
Now we consider the following (n + 1) × (m + 1) matrix:
M2(x, y) =
[−xΓ (x, y)T −∆(x,y)
−Γ (x, y)T xT ∆(x, y)
]
.
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P 0 =
[
x0
z01
]
, Q0 =
[
y0
z02
]
,
x¯ = x0/z01, y¯ = y0/z02
with z01 > 0, z
0
2 > 0. Let (P
0,Q0) be an equilibrium point for the matrix game M2(x¯, y¯)
and P 0T M2(x¯, y¯)Q0 = 0. Then (x¯, y¯) is a feasible solution to both (FP) and (FD) with the
two objective functions having equal values. If also weak duality holds between (FP) and
(FD), then (x¯, y¯) is optimal for both problems.
Theorem 4.4. Let (x¯, y¯) be a feasible solution to both (FP) and (FD). Let
z01 = 1
/(
1 +
n∑
i=1
x¯i
)
, z02 = 1
/(
1 +
m∑
j=1
y¯j
)
,
P 0 =
[
z01x¯
z01
]
, Q0 =
[
z02y¯
z02
]
.
Then (P 0,Q0) solves the matrix game M2(x¯, y¯) and the value of this game is zero.
Now we consider special cases of (FP) and (FD) [2].
If F(x, y) ≡ f (x) + yT h(x) and G(x,y) ≡ g(x), where f,g :Rn → R and h :
R
n →Rm, then, nothing that g(x) > 0, programs (FP) and (FD) reduce to
(FP′) Minimize [f (x) + yT h(x)]/g(x)
subject to h(x) 0,
yT h(x) 0,
x  0,
(FD′) Maximize [f (u)+ vT h(u)]/g(u)
subject to g(u)[∇f (u) + ∇vT h(u)]− [f (u) + vT h(u)]∇g(u) 0,
uT
{
g(u)
[∇f (u) + ∇vT h(u)]− [f (u) + vT h(u)]∇g(u)} 0,
v  0.
Now consider the matrix game associated with the following (n+m+1)× (n+m+1)
skew symmetric matrix:
B3(x, y) =
[ 0 −xh(x)T −T (x, y)
h(x)xT 0 h(x)
T (x, y)T −h(x)T 0
]
,
where T (x, y) = g(x)[∇f (x) + ∇yT h(x)] − [f (x) + yT h(x)]∇g(x).
Theorem 4.5. Let (x¯, y¯) be a feasible solution to both (FP′) and (FD′). Let z∗ = 1/(1 +∑
j x¯j +
∑
i y¯i), x
∗ = z∗x¯ , and y∗ = z∗y¯. Then (x∗, y∗, z∗) solves the matrix game
B3(x¯, y¯).
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x∗/z∗ and y¯ = y∗/z∗. Then (x¯, y¯) is a feasible solution to both (FP′) and (FD′), with the
two objective functions having equal values. In addition, if there is weak duality between
(FP′) and (FD′) then (x¯, y¯) is optimal to both problems.
Now we consider the following matrix:
M3(x, y) =
[−xh(x)T −T (x, y)
−h(x)T xT T (x, y)
]
.
Theorem 4.7. Let
P 0 =
[
x0
z01
]
, Q0 =
[
y0
z02
]
,
x¯ = x0/z01, y¯ = y0/z02
with z01 > 0, z
0
2 > 0. Let (P
0,Q0) be an equilibrium point for the matrix game M3(x¯, y¯)
and P 0T M3(x¯, y¯)Q0 = 0. Then (x¯, y¯) is a feasible solution to both (FP′) and (FD′) with
the two objective functions having equal values. If also weak duality holds between (FP′)
and (FD′), then (x¯, y¯) is optimal for both problems.
Theorem 4.8. Let (x¯, y¯) be a feasible solution to both (FP′) and (FD′). Let
z01 = 1
/(
1 +
n∑
i=1
x¯i
)
, z02 = 1
/(
1 +
m∑
j=1
y¯j
)
,
P 0 =
[
z01x¯
z01
]
, Q0 =
[
z02y¯
z02
]
.
Then (P 0,Q0) solves the matrix game M3(x¯, y¯) and the value of this game is zero.
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